Privacy-preserving statistical data analysis addresses the general question of protecting privacy when publicly releasing information about a sensitive dataset. A privacy attack takes seemingly innocuous released information and uses it to discern the private details of individuals, thus demonstrating that such information compromises privacy. For example, "re-identification attacks" have shown that it is easy to link supposedly de-identified records to the identity of the individual concerned. This survey focuses on attacking aggregate data, such as statistics about how many individuals have a certain disease, genetic trait, or combination thereof. We consider two types of attacks: Reconstruction attacks, which approximately determine a sensitive feature of all the individuals covered by the dataset, and tracing attacks, which determine whether or not a target individual's data is included in the dataset. We also discuss techniques from the differential privacy literature for releasing approximate aggregate statistics whilst provably thwarting any privacy attack.
Introduction
Beginning in the mid-2000's, the field of privacy-preserving statistical analysis of data has witnessed an influx of ideas developed some two decades earlier in the cryptography community. These include formalizing the notion of a privacy adversary, the introduction of a meaningful measure of privacy loss, the development of general and robust definitions of privacy, development of a theory of how privacy loss compounds over reapeated privacy-preserving data access (a process known as composition), the design of basic privacypreserving computational building blocks, techniques for combining these basic building blocks in creative ways to obtain privacy-preserving algorithms for sophisticated analytical tasks, and an investigation of the limits of what can be achieved while preserving privacy. Privacy attacks, that is, algorithms for the privacy adversary to execute, are central to establishing fundamental limits of what is possible; they also play a seminal role in formulating achievable privacy goals. Privacy attacks are the subject of this article.
We will focus on the simple scenario in which there is a dataset x containing sensitive information, and the goal is to release to the public statistics about the dataset. These statistics may be fixed in advance, or may be chosen by the analyst, who queries the database. Speaking intuitively (because we have not defined privacy), the goal in privacypreserving data analysis is to protect the privacy of the individual records in the dataset, even if the analyst maliciously chooses queries according to an attack strategy designed to compromise privacy. We restrict our discussion to a single analyst, as a collection of colluding analysts can be modeled by a single analyst.
To study a class of attacks we need to characterize the notion of success for the attacker, that is, what it means for the adversary to "win". This can make sense even before settling on a formal definition of privacy. For example, we can set a ridiculously low threshold for privacy, or, equivalently, a high threshold for what constitutes a privacy break, such as "The adversary can correctly guess the sickle cell status of 99.999% of the members in the database." Most people would agree that success of this type is inconsistent with any reasonable notion of privacy, so an attack that achieves this goal on arbitrary datasets ostensibly protected by a given technique must be viewed as a repudiation of the protection technique. By the same token, if the protection technique provably satisfies a candidate definition of privacy, then such an attack refutes the value of the definition.
This remainder of this article is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion of three adversarial goals: re-identification; reconstruction, which is precisely the kind of 99.999% correct guessing just described; and tracing, in which the adversary determines whether a given individual is, or is not, present in a given dataset. Tracing can be significant if, for example, the dataset comprises medical records of participants in a pharmaceutical trial, or patient records from an abortion clinic. We will also present some basic definitions that will be used throughout. Reconstruction and tracing attacks are then surveyed in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. Finally, Section 4 discusses differential privacy, a definition of privacy tailored to statistical data analysis, and highlights a variant that achieves the limits established by the attacks. 
Adversarial Goals and Resources
To achieve different adversarial goals may require different resources, so to fully specify an attack we must also specify the resources to which the adversary has access. Examples of resources include computational capabilities and additional, or auxiliary, information beyond what is supplied by interacting with the dataset. Examples of useful auxiliary information might be personal details about an individual, known, for example, to a sibling or co-worker, such as the approximate dates on which one has watched a few movies on Netflix (Narayanan & Shmatikov 2008) , and outputs from a product recommendation system (Calandrino et al. 2011) .
First, we formalize the computational model for interacting with a dataset. Roughly speaking, the raw data remain hidden from the data analyst -who is also our adversary. Information is obtained by posing a "query", which is simply a function mapping datasets to a range, such as the real numbers, and receiving a response in the range. Note that the queries may be specified ahead of time, for example, when a government agency decides on a set of tables to release, or may be specified implicitly, for example, when a release of synthetic data promises to preserve certain statistics of the original data. Regardless, the algorithm that provides the response is called a "mechanism". This survey focuses on linear queries such as, for example, "What fraction of the rows in the dataset satisfy property P ?" (see Definition 4 below).
Definition 1 (Mechanism).
A mechanism is a randomized algorithm, often denoted M, mapping datasets to an arbitrary set of outputs. Let x be an arbitrary dataset. Because M is randomized, M(x) yields a probability distribution on the range of M.
As noted above, databases will be collections of rows, and the mechanisms will provide approximate answers to linear queries over the database. Each database row will correspond to the data of a single individual.
2 Thus, in a database containing information about physical attributes of a collection of individuals, a row might hold the height, weight, and age of a single individual, a query might ask, "What fraction of the members of the dataset are over six feet tall?", and the mechanism might compute the true answer to the query, and produce as output the sum of the true answer and some random noise. In this survey the attacker's access to the database will be exclusively through these mechanisms.
Re-Identification / De-Anonymization. The technical literature and popular press frequently speak about re-identifying data. Such references implicitly assume an approach to privacy protection in which individual data records, containing explicit "identifying" information, are putatively "de-identified" or "anonymized". "Re-identification" refers to reversing this step, tracing an individual record back to its human source. While re-identification may seem difficult in vitro, in real life anyone looking at supposedly de-identified data who is also in possession of auxiliary information about a member of the dataset may well be in a position to re-identify. By linking public, not anonymous records, such as voter registration records, with de-identified data, strangers can do this too (Sweeney 1997; Narayanan & Shmatikov 2008) . Indeed, the richer the dataset, the greater the set of possibilities for useful auxiliary information, and a host of results suggest that "de-identified data isn't", meaning, it is either not de-identified or no longer can serve as data. In the words of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2014), "Anonymization of a data record might seem easy to implement. Unfortunately, it is increasingly easy to defeat anonymization by the very techniques that are being developed for many legitimate applications of big data".
For this reason we will focus herein on the privacy risks posed by the release of statistics.
Reconstruction. Reconstruction is most easily understood by thinking of the database as a collection of rows, one per individual. Imagine that each row contains lots of non-private identifying information and a secret bit, one per individual, for example, indicating whether or not the individual has the gene for Alzheimer's disease. The goal in a reconstruction attack is to determine the secret bits for nearly all individuals in the dataset.
Definition 2 (Reconstruction). Consider an n-row database in which each row contains a unique identifier and a single bit, possibly with additional information. For example, the identifiers might be the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n and the bit might be the sickle cell status. Let b be the column vector of the bits. The reconstruction goal is to produce a vector c of n bits that agrees with b in all but o(n) locations.
A few remarks are in order. First, the identifier is an abstraction: individuals could be identified, for example, by a collection of attributes. There is no need for the adversary waging a reconstruction attack to know an ordering on the rows. Rather, the adversary will learn that the individual with a given set of attributes has a given sickle cell status. At the time of the attack, the attacker might not know "who" actually has this set of attributes. This is scant comfort, however, as the attacker might learn such information at a later date. Second, reconstruction attacks can be launched against a subset of the rows of a dataset, for example, on the members of an extended family, by proper formulation of the linear query, eg, "What fraction of the rows in the dataset correspond to members of family F that are over six feet tall?"
There is by now a rich literature showing that any mechanism providing overly accurate answers to too many linear queries is blatantly non-private, meaning that it succumbs to a reconstruction attack. Indeed, there is a single attack strategy that succeeds against all such overly accurate answering of too many queries. Here "too many" is quite small, e.g., only n queries, and "overly accurate" means having fractional error on the order of o(1/ √ n). This literature is the subject of Section 2.
Tracing. Reconstruction represents spectacular success on the part of the adversary, or, conversely, a spectacular failure of the putative privacy mechanisms. Tracing -that is, determining whether or not a specific individual is a member of a given dataset -is a much more modest 3 adversarial goal 4 .
Tracing entered the popular consciousness when a group of researchers showed how to use 1-way marginals, specifically, allele frequency statistics in a genome-wide association study (GWAS), together with the DNA of a target individual and allele frequency statistics for the general population, to determine the target's presence or absence in the study Homer et al. (2008) . In response, the US National Institutes of Health and the Wellcome Trust changed the access policy to statistics of this type in the studies they fund. Section 3 surveys results in tracing.
The Attack that Isn't: Correlation Detection. We are interested in statistical analysis of data, for example, learning facts about a population such as "smoking causes cancer." Learning the correlation between smoking and cancer may reveal sensitive medical information about an individual known to smoke. However, we do not view this as a privacy compromise, as facts of this type can be learned even if the given individual is not in the dataset. These facts about the population as a whole are precisely what we seek to learn in statistical data analysis. A number of works in the literature discuss "attacks" that in fact consist of correlation detection. We discuss the distinction further in Section 4.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy ensures that even a highly informed adversary, knowing a dataset x and an additional data record r, and interacting with a dataset y ∈ {x ∪ {r}, x} through a differentially private mechanism, cannot determine whether y = x or y = x ∪ {r} (see Section 4 for details). Thus, differential privacy by definition prevents tracing; it also protects against reconstruction and re-identification. At the same time it permits the analyst to learn precisely the type of statistical correlations just discussed. Surprisingly, this very strong guarantee comes at no extra cost in accuracy, in the following sense: the bounds shown in Section 4 for achieving differential privacy match the limits imposed by reconstruction and tracing attacks in Sections 2 and 3.
Reconstruction Attacks
Suppose we have a data set of n individuals. For each individual i, we have information (xi, si). There is one bit, denoted si, that is considered sensitive and unknown a priori to an attacker (perhaps it indicates i's political party affiliation, diabetes status, or lack of interest in Bayesian decision theory). The remainder of the record, denoted xi, is public and easily available-for example, the demographic information visible on i's Facebook account.
A well-intentioned curator might want to release various statistics about how the secret vector s = (s1, ..., sn) relates to the public variables x. For example, if each xi is a list of d binary attributes, xi = (xi(1), ..., xi(d)) ∈ {0, 1} d , then one might want to release, for example:
1. the joint marginal distribution of si with each of the attributes (that is, for each j, a 2 × 2 contingency table indicating how many records have each of the four possible combinations for the pair si, xi(j)); 2. the joint marginal of si together with every subset of k public attributes, for some integer k > 1 (that is, a collection of d k contingency tables, each with 2 k+1 entries).
3. the coefficients of a logistic regression model fit to predict si from xi;
Under what conditions do such releases allow an attacker, who knows the xi's and the released statistics, to reconstruct all or most of the vector s? What if the curator releases only approximate statistics? These questions are addressed by reconstruction attacks, as introduced by Dinur & Nissim (2003) and developed by a large body of subsequent work.
Let M the denote the mechanism used by the curator to generate a vector of released statisticsq = M(x, s).
Definition 3. A mechanism M is blatantly nonprivate for a public data set x if there is an attack A such that for every vector s, we have Ham(s,ŝ) ≤ n 10 , whereŝ = A(x, M(x, s)). Here Ham(s,ŝ) denotes the Hamming distance between two vectors (that is, the number of positions in which they differ).
Thus, as discussed informally in the Introduction, a mechanism is blatantly nonprivate if it allows an attacker to reconstruct almost all secret bits si. There is nothing special about reconstruction of 9/10 of the entries of s; we could have used any other constant close to 1. When we say that a class (or set or collection) of mechanisms is blatantly nonprivate, we mean that there exists a single attack algorithm A that works against every mechanism in the class.
Note that since the attack works for every secret vector s, it cannot rely on detecting underlying statistical correlations between x and s. It is not an instance of "correlation detection" (see the end of Section 1), 5 but rather an attack learning information highly specific to this particular data set.
Reconstruction from Linear Statistics
The releases discussed above all share a particular structure, namely that the exact statistics are linear functions of the secret vector s: for each one, we can interpret the released statisticsq as an approximation to Bs for some matrix B, whose rows correspond to queries. For example, releasing the pairwise marginals of s with each public column (the setting in Example 1, above) reveals, in particular, Bs where B = x and x is the matrix of public values. Releasing (k + 1)-way contingency tables (2, above) reveals Bs, where the rows of B consist of all d k entry-wise products of subsets of k columns of x. Less obviously, releasing the logistic regression coefficients also corresponds to a linear release, by viewing the released coefficients as a vector where the gradient of the logistic loss function, summed over all pairs (xi, si), is 0 d .
In all these settings, the task of the attacker A is to solve a noisy system of linear equations. To allow comparing results, we'll normalize the matrix B so that entries lie in [0, 1] , and divide the result by n to obtain an answer in [0, 1]. 
If a collection of fractional linear query statistics, given by the rows of a matrix B, is answered to within some error α, we get the following problem:
Definition 5 (B-reconstruction problem). Given a matrix B and a vectorq = 1 n Bs + e, where e ∞ ≤ α and s ∈ {0, 1} n , findŝ with Ham(ŝ, s) ≤ n 10
. The reconstruction error is the fraction
Understanding reconstruction attacks based on linear statistics thus boils down to understanding when the B-reconstruction problem can be solved, and how efficiently. The theory of noisy linear systems is deep and well-developed, with extensive connections to numerical analysis, geometry, compressed sensing and the theory of streaming algorithms. In the remainder of this section, we give a taste of how it applies to reconstruction.
An Exponential Attack
An important class of linear statistics are sums of subsets of the bits of s, which correspond to matrices B with entries in with entires in {0, 1}. As a warm-up, consider what happens when approximations to all possible subset sums are released, that is, when B has 2 n rows, one for every vector in {0, 1} n . Since the normalised subset sums lie in [0, 1], the accuracy parameter must be less than as the approximation to each normalised subset sum, regardless of s, satisfies the accuracy requirement).
In this case, we can get nontrivial reconstruction attacks whenever the accuracy parameter α goes to 0 (that is, when error in answer the queries is a vanishing fraction of the queries' maximum possible value).
Theorem 6 (Dinur & Nissim (2003) ). When B ∈ {0, 1} 2 n ×n has all possible rows in {0, 1} n , there is an attack A that solves the B-reconstruction problem with reconstruction error at most 4α (given α-accurate query answers), for every α > 0. In particular, every mechanism that releases such statistics is blatantly nonprivate when α < 1/40.
Proof. This brute-force attack simply enumerates all vectorss ∈ {0, 1} n and picks one that agrees, within α, with all entries ofq, meaning q − 1 n Bs ∞ ≤ α. We know such ans exists because s is a solution. Let us call itŝ.
We now argue that
Ham(ŝ,s) n ≤ 4α. Let b0 = s, and let b1 denote the bit-wise complement of s (that is, the n-bit vector with zeros in positions where s has ones, and ones where s has zeros). Sinceŝ agreed withq in the position corresponding to b0, we have
Since by assumption b 0 ,s n −q b 0 ≤ α, we have that s andŝ disagree on at most 2αn locations in which s is zero. An analogous argument shows they disagree on at most 2αn locations in which s is one (based on their mutual agreement withq b 1 ).
Theorem 6 has important implications: there is no way to construct of a "noisy table" that will permit highly accurate answers to be derived for computations that are not specied at the outset, even if only a relatively small number of linear queries will ever be of interest. Because we do not know in advance which queries will be of interest, the table must permit the analyst to learn accurate answers to all queries. Theorem 6 tells us that any such table providing answers to all 2 n queries described in the theorem will succumb to a reconstruction attack. As a result, when releasing information about sensitive data, we must make choices: since no method can accurately and privately provide answers to everything, thought must given to the use of the resource.
Attacks Requiring only Polynomially Many Queries
The attack of the previous section runs in exponential time, and requires a release of exponentially many statistics. What can we do when the number of released statistics and the time available to the attacker are more limited? Before giving a general answer to this question, we consider a few special cases.
Theorem 7 (Dwork & Yekhanin (2008)). There exists a matrix B ∈ {0, 1} 2n×n and an attack A running in time O(n log n) that solves the B-reconstruction problem with reconstruction error at most 16α 2 n when the answers are α-accurate. In particular, every mechanism that releases such statistics is blatantly nonprivate when α <
A similar result is known to hold when the entries of B are chosen uniformly at random, though the number of rows must then be larger than n by a constant factor and the attack takes longer (about the time required to multiply two n × n matrices), and even if a certain constant number of responses have unbounded error (Dinur & Nissim 2003; Dwork et al. 2007 ). Furthermore, one can interpolate smoothly through Theorems 6 and 7. The following slightly generalizes a result of Dinur & Nissim (2003) : Theorem 8. There exists an attack A such that, if B is chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1} m×n and 1.1n ≤ m ≤ 2 n then, with high probability over the choice of B, A(B,q),
given any α-accurate answersq, solves B-reconstruction with error β = o(1) as long as
. In particular, there is a c > 0 such that every mechanism for answering the queries in B with error α ≤ c log( m n )/n is blatantly nonprivate.
The constant 1.1 in the theorem is somewhat arbitrary. It suffices that log(m/n) be bounded below by a positive constant. We omit the proof of Theorem 8, though we outline below a general connection to discrepancy theory on which the proof is based.
Reconstruction, Spectral Bounds and Discrepancy
Understanding linear reconstruction attacks boils down to understanding the geometric properties of the query matrix B. We start by describing a very efficient attack, due to Dwork & Yekhanin (2008) , which provides a proof of Theorem 7. The attack relies on bounding the eigenvalues of B.
Proof of Theorem 7. Suppose for now that n = 2 is an integer power of 2. To simplify computations, we allow the coefficients of the query matrix to lie in {−1, 1}, instead of {0, 1}. (One can always simulate a query with {−1, 1} coefficients using two queries with {0, 1} coefficients, at the cost of doubling the allowed error α).
We take B to be the Hadamard matrix H , defined recursively by the formula H0 = (1) and Hi+1 = Hi Hi Hi −Hi . H is a n × n matrix (since n = 2 ) with entries in {±1} with the property that H 2 = nI where I is the identity matrix. This means that the inverse of H is 1 n H , and that the eigenvalues of H are all ± √ n. Givenq = 1 n H s + e, the attacker first multiplies by H = (
Now the 2 norm of e is at most α √ n since each of its entries has absolute value at most α. Because the eigenvalues of H are ± √ n, the 2 norm of H e is at most αn. Thus, we have r − s 2 2 ≤ α 2 n 2 .
In the second step, the attacker rounds each entry of r to the nearer of {0, 1} to obtain a candidate data setŝ ∈ {0, 1} n . We'll use the following claim (proved below).
Claim 1. Let s ∈ {0, 1} n and r ∈ R n be arbitrary, and letŝ be obtained by rounding the
The attacker's reconstruction error β is thus Ham(ŝ, s) ≤ 4α 2 n. The constant claimed in the theorem statement is slightly higher than 4, since we must take into account the conversion from ±1 to {0, 1} in the query coefficients, and also the padding required to get n to the next largest power of 2. The running time of the attack, perhaps surprisingly, is less than the time it takes to write down the matrix H . Because of the recursive form of H , we can use a divide-andconquer algorithm similar to the Fast Fourier Transform to multiply any n-entry vector by H in time O(n log n). (Multiplication by H is in fact a Fourier transform over an appropriate group.)
Finally, we prove Claim 1. Notice thatŝ and s differ only in positions j where |r(j) − s(j)| ≥ 1 2 (and hence (r(j) − s(j)) 2 ≥ 1/4). The average of (r(j) − s(j)) 2 over all entries is r − s 2 2 /n. By Markov's inequality, the fraction of squared entries over 1/4 is at most 4 r − s 2 2 /n, which proves the claim.
A careful inspection of the proof of the previous theorem shows that B-reconstruction is possible roughly whenever B ∈ [0, 1] m×n has at least n rows, and its least singular value is bounded below by a known quantity σmin. The attack simply multipliesq by nB † , where B † is the left pseudoinverse of B, and rounds the result to {0, 1} n . The reconstruction error is then at most 4α 2 nm/σ 2 min , since the maximum singular value of the pseudoinverse is 1/σmin. This general connection was used by Kasiviswanathan et al. (2010 Kasiviswanathan et al. ( , 2013 to get results for k-way marginal releases and several more general kinds of releases, including the logistic regression example at the beginning of this section.
For k-way marginal releases, the number of released statistics is 2
(since each released contingency tables gives marginal statistics for a set of k − 1 public attributes and the secret attribute). The question raised by Kasiviswanathan et al. (2010) was, how large does d have to be to carry out meaningful reconstruction? So far, the attacks we considered used matrices B with m > n rows, but the rows were selected independently (as in Theorem 8 or to be far apart from each other (as in the proof of Theorem 7). Such query matrices can arise with 2-way statistics (setting 1 from the beginning of this section, on page 6), but require high-dimensional data: d must be at least n. To get matrices with n independent rows in the setting of k-way statistics would also require d > n, effectively wasting many of the released statistics. Building on results from random matrix theory, Kasiviswanathan et al. (2010) showed that in fact, it suffices that the total number of released statistics 2
be at least c k n for a constant c k > 1 (that depends on k but not d or n); in particular, the dimension of the data d need only grow as n 1/k .
Though the spectral argument is very useful, it has limitations. A more sophisticated argument, based on restricted isometry properties, was used by Dwork et al. (2007) (and later generalized by De (2012) ) to handle releases where most statistics are answered α-accurately, but the error on some fraction (bounded by a parameter η) of statistics is arbitrarily high. For various classes of random matrices, the attack runs in polynomial time as long as η is a sufficiently small constant. In fact, the attack works as long as η < −Ω(1) (that is, as long as a strict majority of statistics are α-accurate), though it takes exponential time in general.
2.4.1. Discrepancy-based bounds. We can in fact characterize when reconstruction from linear statistics is possible, using a combinatorial analogue of the spectral argument. The framework we use here was formulated by Muthukrishnan & Nikolov (2012) , abstracting the idea in the proof of Theorem 6. Consider an attacker who knows B and an α-accurate answer vectorq, and wants to decide if a particular data setŝ is a plausible candidate for the true data set s.
A natural approach is simply to check if all the entries of
Bŝ are within α of the entries ofq (that is, if q − 1 n Bŝ ∞ ≤ α), and "accept"ŝ as plausible if that is the case. This procedure will always accept the true vector s; under what conditions will it accept an incorrect vectorŝ? By the triangle inequality, if this procedure acceptsŝ then every entry of 1 n B(s −ŝ) must be at most 2α:
Ifŝ differs from s in more than βn positions, then (s −ŝ) is a vector with entries in {−1, 0, 1} of which at least βn entries are not zero. We can therefore ensure that no vector s that at Hamming distance βn from s gets accepted if we ensure that Bz is large for all appropriate z.
If the partial discrepancy is at least 2αn, then no candidateŝ which is at Hamming distance more than βn from s will be accepted by the procedure above, that is, the reconstruction attack succeeds. We can thus define an (exponential-time) attack which has reconstruction error at most β whenever the accuracy α satisfies
This idea underlies, among other results, the proof of Theorem 8.
Conversely, if the partial discrepancy is less than 2αn, then we can find vectors s,ŝ and q such that s andŝ are far apart (at Hamming distance at least βn), butq is α-accurate for both data sets. Thus, no reconstruction attack based onq can reliably have reconstruction error less than β 2 ; reconstruction attacks work if and only if the partial discrepancy of the query matrix exceeds the error parameter α of the mechanism releasing the statistics.
The partial discrepancy generalizes the spectral arguments, since the smallest singular value of B gives a lower bound on its partial discrepancy:
n with at least βn nonzero entries has Euclidean norm at least √ βn). At the end of this survey, we describe differential privacy, a class of algorithms that resist reconstruction attacks (and enjoy other important properties). Perhaps surprisingly, when the size n of the data set is very large, one can in fact answer a batch of linear queries with error roughly comparable to a slight generalization of the partial discrepancy, called the hereditary discrepancy (Nikolov et al. 2013) . We omit the exact statement here.
Tracing Attacks
Reconstruction attacks are devastating when they occur, but simply avoiding reconstruction is not a satisfactory guarantee of privacy on its own. For example, consider the "subsampling algorithm:" subsample a random τ fraction of the dataset and release those samples. The reconstruction attacks from Section 2 will fail when given only this subsample, since the released subsample is completely independent of the data of a (1 − τ ) fraction of the rows 6 , and yet a large number of individuals lose all privacy. We remark that subsampling ensures that very few people-only those unlucky enough to be in the subsample-can possibly have their privacy compromised. We have often heard objections of the form "only a few people will be hurt" in defense of weak privacy protections. When such risks are acceptable, subsampling provides a crisp privacy solution, accompanied by a plethora of utility results.
Tracing is a more subtle privacy breach than reconstruction. In a tracing attack, the attacker has (possibly noisy) statistics about the dataset and the data of a target individual, and wants to determine if that target individual is present in the dataset or not. As we have discussed, mere presence in the dataset can be highly sensitive information. By weakening the attacker's goal to tracing, we will be able to reason about the privacy risks of very simple statistics, perturbed with a large amount of noise, even when the attacker has very limited auxiliary information.
As we will demonstrate, in a rather general model of a tracing attack, not only does the subsampling algorithm allow an attacker to trace a τ fraction of the individuals in the dataset, but so does any algorithm of comparable utility! 1. We model our population by a distribution P over {±1} d . We call d the dimension 6 Note that the subsampling algorithm introduces error proportional to
Tracing from Exact Statistics
, so there is no contradiction with the results in Section 2.
of the data. We assume that P is a product distribution and we let
be the population mean. We call pj the j-th marginal of the population. Note that P is entirely described by p. 2. There is a dataset x = {x1, . . . , xn} consisting of n i.i.d. samples from P . 3. The sample mean
is released. We use standard notation from the computation science literature and write xi ∼ x to mean that xi is sampled from the uniform distribution over the elements of x. We call qj the j-th marginal of the sample. 4. The attacker has the data y ∈ {±1}
d of a target individual. That individual y is either IN the dataset, meaning y is a uniformly random element of x, or OUT of the dataset, meaning y is an independent random sample from P . The attacker's goal is to distinguish these two cases. 5. The population P is unknown to the attacker. However, the attacker has a collection of m i.i.d. reference samples z = {z1, . . . , zm} from P .
The attack is a function A(y, q, z) that takes the data of the target individual, the released marginals, and the reference samples and outputs a value in {IN, OUT}. (2015)) design an attack based on hypothesis testing. Consider the null hypothesis H0 corresponding to the case where y is OUT of the dataset, meaning that y is a random sample from the population P , i.e. y is sampled from a product distribution with marginals p. Also consider the alternative hypothesis H1 corresponding to the case where y is IN the dataset 7 . In this case y is a random sample from the dataset x, which can be approximated by a product distribution with mean q. If the attacker has p and q, then the optimal way to determine if y is sampled from the population or the dataset is to perform a log-likelihood test. While our model assumes that the vector q is released, it also assumes that p is unknown. However, if the attacker has sufficiently many reference samples z1, . . . , zm, then the averagê p = 1 m m i=1 zi will be a suitable approximation to p for the attack. All of the attacks discussed in this section can (directly or with minor changes) be carried out using no information about the reference set z except its mean. We can summarize what is known about this attack in the following theorem.
Homer et al. (2008) and Sankararaman et al. (2009) (see also the analysis of Yu

Theorem 10 (Sankararaman et al. (2009)).
There is an attack A(y, q, z) that takes the data y ∈ {±1} d of a targeted individual, the exact sample mean q of a dataset x of dimension d = O(n log(1/δ)), and m = O(n) reference samples z = {z1, . . . , zm} ⊆ {±1} d such that for every non-trivial product distribution P ,
2. If y is OUT of the dataset x, then P [A(y, q, z) = OUT] ≥ 1 − δ.
In both of these statements, the probabilities are taken over the random choices of the dataset x ∼ P n , the reference samples z ∼ P m , and the choice of y according to either y ∼ x (IN) or y ∼ P (OUT). In other words, the probabilities of both type I and type II errors are at most δ.
In this theorem, a non-trivial product distribution is one whose marginals are bounded away from −1 and 1. This condition is very mild, and serves to rule out pathological cases, such as a population in which every member of the population has the same data.
Robust Tracing for Noisy Statistics
What happens if the attacker does not get the exact sample mean q, but instead only a noisy sample meanq? Is it still possible to trace individuals in the dataset? As Dwork et al. (2015d) showed, the answer is resoundingly "yes!" However, it takes much more care to formalize tracing attacks when the statistics can be noisy. To see why tracing attacks are more subtle with only noisy statistics, we give a few examples of ways that the sample mean can be perturbed to make tracing difficult.
Example 11. Subsampling is one way to introduce noise into statistics. That is, we can take a dataset x = {x1, . . . , xn} of n samples obtain a datasetx = {x1, . . . ,xs} ⊆ x of s ≈ τ n samples for some τ > 0. Now we can release the exact meanq = 1 s s i=1x i of x of the subsample, which is a noisy sample mean of x. Sampling theory tells us that the average over coordinates j of |qj −qj| ≈ 1 √ τ n . However, when we run a tracing attack on the released meanq, and a random target individual xi that is IN the dataset x, with with probability 1 − τ , xi is independent ofq. Thus, we have
in contrast to the case of exact statistics where Theorem 10 yields
where P
IN
[E] is the probability of the event E when y is IN the dataset, and P
OUT
[E] is defined
analogously.
The subsampling example shows that, in general, we must give up on tracing every individual who is in the dataset (but see Theorem 16 for a case in which all individuals in the dataset can be traced). Thus, we will set our sights on tracing at least one individual in the dataset.
As our next example shows, the role played by the population P is much more delicate when the statistics can be noisy.
Example 12. Suppose the population P and its mean p were fixed and known. Then instead of releasing the exact sample mean q of the dataset, the algorithm could release the "noisy" population meanq = p. By sampling theory, we will have that |qj −qj| ≈ 1 √ n on average over coordinates j. Note that, while the population mean is likely of more interest than the sample mean, they are "noisy" for the purposes of this example because they are not equal to the sample mean. If we are only given the population meanq, then we cannot hope to trace becauseq is independent of the dataset. Thus,
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This example does not give an actual algorithm for releasing an approximately correct sample mean, because we cannot assume that the holder of the dataset knows the population mean. However, it demonstrates the need to model the data holder's uncertainty about the population. Thus, we assume that each of the population marginals pj is itself random and chosen i.i.d. from some probability distribution P over [−1, 1].
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Clearly P must be non-trivially random, or else the population's marginals are not really uncertain. Our final example considers two types of non-trivial yet "degenerate" distributions P that will make it impossible to trace from noisy statistics.
Example 13. Suppose that P is uniform on some interval [a, b] for some 0 < a < b < 1. Then, the noisy samplemeanq = (
) will satisfy |qj −qj| b−a 2 for every coordinate j. As in the previous example,q is independent of the dataset, so tracing cannot succeed against an algorithm that outputsq. This example shows that P must be "well spread" in the sense that it must be significant mass on values that are farther apart than the amount of noise we are willing to add to the mean. Now, suppose that P is either − with equal probability. For this choice of P, every population marginal pj is in {± }. By sampling theory, we will have |qj −qj| ≈ 1 √ n on average over coordinates j. However changing the data of one person xi will, with high probability, not changeq at all. Therefore,q is nearly independent of any specific person in the dataset, making tracing impossible. This example shows that P must be "smooth" in addition to being "well spread."
The distributions in the example above show that for tracing to succeed, P must avoid certain pathologies. The specific technical conditions we need to impose are beyond the scope of this article, but can be found in Dwork et al. (2015d) . In the sequel, we will refer to a distribution P satisfying these unspecified conditions as a strong distribution. For example, the uniform distribution on [−1, 1] is strong, as is the uniform distribution on an interval of sufficient length or a Beta distribution with "reasonable" parameters.
3.2.1. The Model. To address these pathologies, we need to modify some features of the model we described in Section 3.1. These modifications only affect the way the population P is chosen and the way the released vectorq are chosen, so we only give the modifications to these two parts of the model. 1'. We model our population P by a distribution P over {±1} d . We call d the dimension of the data. We assume that P is a product distribution and we let
so that pj is the mean of the j-th attribute in the population. Each coordinate pj will be random and chosen i.i.d. from a strong distribution P. 3'. There is an algorithm M that takes the dataset x and outputs a noisy sample mean q = M(x). This vector satisfies
e. |qj −qj| ≤ α on average over coordinates j). Recall that q = 1 n n i=1 xi. If M is randomized, then we require that accuracy holds with probability at least 2/3 over this randomization. We call an algorithm that outputs such a vector α-accurate. The Robust Tracing Attack
We can interpret the quantities y,q and z,q as the correlation of the noisy sample mean with the target individual and a random member of the population, respectively. Thus, the attack is testing "is the target individual's data significantly more correlated with the released statistics than a random member of the population?" The attack itself is quite similar to the one used by Homer et al. (2008) , but the analysis is necessarily quite different because we can no longer view the attack as testing one of two simple hypotheses.
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That is, since the distribution P and the algorithm M are unknown to the attacker, the cases of IN and OUT no longer give rise to two specific distributions on the triple (y,q, z), and instead each case now corresponds to a whole family of distributions (a composite hypothesis).
We can summarize the properties of this attack in the following theorem.
Theorem 14 (Dwork et al. (2015d) ). There is an attack A(y, q, z) that takes a noisy sample meanq of a dataset x of dimension d = O(n 2 log(1/δ)), the data y ∈ {±1} d of a targeted individual, and a single reference sample z ∈ {±1} d , such that if the population P 's mean is chosen from any strong distribution P, andq = M(x) for any 1/2-accurate M,
In both of these statements, the probabilities are taken over the random choices of the population P 's marginals p ∼ P d , the dataset x ∼ P n , the possibly random choice of noisy marginalsq ∼ M(x), the reference sample z ∼ P , and the choice of y according to either y ∼ x (IN) or y ∼ P (OUT).
Some comments are in order. First, note that this theorem is non-trivial when δ 1/n. In this case, when given a random member of the dataset, the attack will say IN with probability Ω(1/n), but when given a random member of the population the attack says IN with probability at most δ 1/n. Second, note that the condition of 1/2-accuracy is very weak-much less accurate than applications would require-and it is rather surprising that we can trace in the presence of so much noise. In exchange for requiring such a weak notion of accuracy, the attack is only guaranteed to trace when d n 2 , whereas for exact marginals the attack in Theorem 10 was able to trace with dimension d ≈ n. As we will see in Section 4, such high dimension is necessary to guarantee tracing, because when d = o(n 2 ) we can simultaneously achieve nontrivial accuracy and a strong guarantee of privacy (see Theorem 20, for a precise statement). However, for certain algorithms M , this attack may succeed even when d is much smaller.
Analysis of the Robust Tracing Attack A full proof of Theorem 14 is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we give some basic intuition for why the attack works and how to analyze it. First, suppose y is OUT of the dataset x. Then y and z are independent samples from the population P . Moreover, since x = {x1, . . . , xn} is independent of y, z, and q = M(x), y and z are distributed as two independent samples from P even when conditioned on any fixed value ofq (even one that is not accurate). For anyq, we have E [ y,q − z,q ] = 0. Furthermore, since P is a product distribution, the coordinates of y and z are independent and y,q − z,q can be written as the sum of d bounded independent random variables. Applying Hoeffding's inequality to y,q − z,q thus shows that
The OUT case of the theorem follows by setting an appropriate choice of T = O( d log(1/δ)) and taking expectation overq. Now, consider the more difficult case where y is IN the dataset x. The crucial claim to establish is that
If the inequaltiy 1 holds, then by a concentration of measure argument we obtain that n i=1 xi − z,q ≥ Ω(d) holds with high probability. Consequently, with high probability, for some y = xi, we have y,q − z,q ≥ Ω(d/n), and we want to ensure that this quantity is larger than the threshold T . Given our choice of T = O( d log(1/δ)), the IN case of the theorem follows by taking an appropriately large choice of d = O(n 2 log(1/δ)).
It remains to justify our claim (1). By linearity of expectations, it suffices to understand the case of d = 1 and show that
For intuition, consider the case of exact statistics whereq = q =
as long as the distribution P has high variance (i.e. the population mean p is bounded away from −1 and 1). It remains to show that introducing error intoq does not completely "break" the correlation betweenq and n i=1 xi. Suppose the exact marginal is q = 1. In this case, the dataset must be x1 = x2 = · · · = xn = 1. Even if the answers are very noisy, we have thatq > +1/2. Similarly, if the exact marginal is q = −1 thenq < −1/2. Now, as a thought experiment, start with the dataset x1 = · · · = xn = +1 and change the xis from +1 to −1 one-by-one until the dataset x1 = · · · = xn = −1 is reached. The sum of these changes takesq from > +1/2 to < −1/2. Thus, on average over i, changing each xi changesq by > 1/n. So "on average" we have correlation at least 1/n between each xi andq. To establish our general claim about the correlation between n i=1 xi andq, we need to show that, when x1, . . . , xn are chosen randomly as in our model, the correlation behaves like the average in this thought experiment, which requires the use of our assumption that P is a strong distribution.
3.2.3. Additional Results. The strength of Theorem 14 is in the weakness of its assumptions. However, as we have described, these weak assumptions lead to somewhat weaker conclusions than what Theorem 10 gives for exact tracing, and certainly weaker than a reconstruction attack. Nonetheless, as the next theorem shows, if we have more accuracy and more reference samples, then we can trace with much lower dimensional data. that if the population mean P is chosen from any strong distribution P, andq = M(x) for any α-accurate M,
The probabilities are taken over the same random choices as in Theorem 14.
This result smoothly interpolates between Theorem 14 (minimal accuracy, minimal reference samples, higher dimension) and Theorem 10 (perfect accuracy, many reference samples, lower dimension). For every value of α > 0, the dimension required by our attack is essentially optimal, by the positive results we present in Section 4.
The attack in this result is nearly identical to the one presented in Figure 1 . The only difference is that we are given m + 1 reference samples z0, z1, . . . , zm. z0 acts like the single reference sample in the basic attack, whileẑ = 1 m m i=1 zi serves as an estimate of the population mean. Specifically, instead of computing y − z,q , we compute y − z,q −ẑ , and apply a suitable threshold.
The first guarantee of this attack can be rephrased as saying that, on average, the attack outputs IN for 1/α 2 of the n individuals in the sample. On the other hand, we can release α-accurate marginals by using a random subsample of size O(1/α 2 ). This comparison justifies our claim that every algorithm allows almost the same number of individuals to be traced as the subsampling algorithm with comparable accuracy. In some settings we can make an even stronger claim and trace every individual. Of course, we can only do this if we place restrictions that rule out the subsampling algorithm. One such restriction is to require that the algorithm is symmetric-that is, it "treats all users the same," which can be formalized by requiring that the noisy marginals q ∼ M(x) depend only on the vector of exact marginals q. In Markov chain notation, x → q →q. This rules out the subsampling algorithm, and allows us to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 16. There is an attack A(y, q, z) that takes a noisy sample meanq of a dataset x of dimension d = O(n 2 log(1/δ)), the data y ∈ {±1} d of a targeted individual, and a single reference sample z ∈ {±1} d such that if the population P 's marginals are chosen from any strong distribution P, andq = M(x) for any symmetric 1/2-accurate M,
www.annualreviews.org • Hiding in Plain Sight2. If y is OUT of the dataset x, then P [A(y, q, z) = OUT] ≥ 1 − δ.
In other words, the probabilities of both type I and type II errors are bounded by δ. The probabilities are taken over the same random choices as in Theorem 14.
In this setting the attack is the one described in Figure 1 , and only the analysis changes.
Differential Privacy: Free at the Limit
The limits imposed by reconstruction and tracing attacks are absolute: no mechanism protecting against reconstruction and tracing can introduce less noise than is required to stymie the attacks discussed earlier. However, there are other adversarial goals, such as learning the sickle cell status of a specific individual, that do not require reconstruction, re-identification, or tracing, and each of these new goals may have its own set of attack strategies. A privacy solution that rules out reconstruction and tracing may not rule out attacks satisfying these other goals. The cryptographic approach to this dilemma is to first define privacy and then provide techniques that provably satisfy this definition. If the definition is too weak, in that it fails to protect against an important class of adversarial goals, it can be strengthened and new algorithms designed. The advantage to the definitional approach is that, because the definitions are getting stronger, progress is made. Differential privacy was first proposed in 2006 and so far has not required strengthening. Differential privacy is a very strong definition, and it is not without cost. Nonetheless in one sense it is for free: differential privacy can be achieved by introducing exactly as much noise as is necessary to combat the specific attacks of the previous sections. In other words, the marginal cost of achieving differential privacy and all the protection that entails is zero, if one is protecting against reconstruction and tracing.
Defining Privacy
Our ultimate privacy goal when releasing information about a sensitive dataset is to ensure that anything that can be learnt about an individual from the released information, can be learnt without that individual's data being included. This goal does not ensure that nothing about an individual can be learnt from the released information, which can only be achieved by releasing no information ( (Dwork & Naor 2008; Dwork 2006) ). For example, as discussed in the introduction, releasing the fact that smoking and lung cancer are strongly correlated reveals sensitive information about any individual known to smoke; however, we do not to consider this to be a privacy violation, as learning this correlation has nothing to do with the use of that individual's data. Our goal is only to protect sensitive information that is localized to a single individual's data.
Differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006b ) is such a quantitative privacy goal. Differential privacy is a property of a procedure or mechanism M that takes a sensitive dataset x and releases the output M(x). We compare the output M(x) with a hypothetical output M(y) in which the input x is changed to y by removing, adding, or modifying the data of a single individual. The requirement of differential privacy is that M(x) should be indistinguishable from M(y) for any inputs x and y differing only on the data of a single individual:
Definition 17 (Differential Privacy (Dwork et al. 2006b )). A mechanism M satisfies ε-differential privacy if, for any datasets x and y differing only on the data of a single indi-vidual and any potential outcomeq,
Setting ε = 0 corresponds to revealing no information (M(x) and M(y) are identically distributed), whereas setting ε > 0 permits revealing some information about individuals.
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The definition of differential privacy (2) is inherently probabilistic; as in cryptography, randomness is used to "hide" or "obscure" the individual information we wish not to reveal. Thus any non-trivial differentially private release of information requires randomization.
We remark that there are several variants of this definition of differential privacy, which are similar in spirit to what we discuss here, but have important quantitative differences. A common generalization of differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006a ) introduces a second parameter δ and replaces (2) with P [T (M(x)) = 1] ≤ e ε · P [T (M(y)) = 1] + δ, which is required to hold for all functions T . For clarity, we only discuss the simplest definition. Differential privacy is a very "robust" definition -as we would expect of a meaningful privacy guarantee. In particular, it satisfies the following important properties.
• Postprocessing: Additional analysis of the released information or the inclusion of information from other sources will not change the differential privacy guarantee. In particular, if an attack (such as those discussed earlier) were applied to a differentially private release, then the guarantee of differential privacy would apply to the output of the attack, which precludes successful reconstruction or tracing.
• Composition: If the same individual's data is used in multiple releases, then, as long as each release satisfies differential privacy on its own, the combination of these releases also satisfies differential privacy. However, the quantitative privacy guarantee degrades, namely, if each release satisfies ε-differential privacy, then the combination of k such releases satisfies kε-differential privacy.
• Group privacy: If information is shared by several individuals (such as a family), differential privacy continues to protect this information. 11 Again, the privacy guarantee degrades with the number of individuals we wish to protect simultaneously. That is, if x differs from y by the addition, removal, or modification of the data of at most k individuals and M satisfies ε-differential privacy, then
for all possible outcomesq.
Composition is arguably the signature property of differential privacy, as it permits differentially private analyses to be viewed as part of a larger system. Privacy-preserving data analysis does not occur in a vacuum -a single individual's data may be used multiple times over her lifetime. Furthermore, simple mechanisms can be composed to perform complex analytical tasks. The richness of the literature on differential privacy largely stems from the fact that composition permits an algorithmic approach to differential privacy, whereby simple building blocks can be combined in sophisticated ways to carry out a wide variety of analytical tasks. Perhaps the most surprising property of differential privacy is that, despite its protective strength, it is compatible with meaningful data analysis. An extensive literature has been developed showing that a wide range of useful analyses can be carried out subject to differential privacy and its variants (for an introduction to and overview of differential privacy, see the textbook on the subject (Dwork & Roth 2014a) ). Indeed, the parameter regime where the attacks of Sections 2 and 3 break down is very close to the setting where it becomes possible to release approximate aggregate statistics whilst satisfying differential privacy.
We remark that differential privacy is not only useful for privacy: A major concern in empirical science is the danger of overfitting data and reaching conclusions that are specific to the dataset, rather than generalizing to the larger population from which that dataset was drawn. This problem is exacerbated by adaptivity -that is, when an analysis of a dataset is informed by prior exploration of the same dataset, standard hypothesis testing techniques may misrepresent the significance of a hypothesis due to the dependence between the hypothesis and the dataset that has been introduced by prior use (e.g. through model selection). However, differential privacy also offers protection from such overfitting (Dwork et al. 2015c,b,a; Bassily et al. 2016) . Namely, if a dataset is only used in a differentially private manner, then any conclusion drawn from that information cannot overfit the dataset. This is especially useful in the adaptive setting, as the composition property of differential privacy holds even for adaptive data analysis. Indeed, differentially private algorithms provide nearly-optimal results for adaptive data analysis (Hardt & Ullman 2014; Steinke & Ullman 2015) . Thus we see that differential privacy can, in fact, be an aid to analysis, even when privacy is not a concern.
Example: The Gaussian Mechanism
Having defined a formal privacy goal, we now discuss an example technique for releasing aggregate statistics about a dataset while protecting privacy. We restrict our attention to aggregate statistics of the form "what fraction of people in the dataset have property q?" For example, q may be the property "smoke and have cancer." This is a simple, yet powerful, class of aggregate statistics, often called counting queries.
We assume that k properties q = (q1, · · · , q k ) are specified and we will release approximate answers for all of them on a given dataset x containing the data of n individuals. Let qj(x) denote the fraction of individuals in the dataset x having property qj and q(x) = (q1(x), · · · , q k (x)).
Definition 18 (Gaussian Mechanism). Given properties q = (q1, · · · , q k ), the Gaussian mechanism M q,σ 2 takes x as input and releasesq = (q1, · · · ,q k ) where eachqj is an independent sample from N (qj(x), σ 2 ), for an appropriate variance σ 2 .
We first ask whether M q,σ 2 (x) releases useful information about x: We would like to know qj(x), but the Gaussian mechanism only gives us an approximationqj. Whether this error with standard deviation σ is acceptable depends on the context. However, in many situations, the dataset x is itself a random sample of size n from a larger distribution, in which case qj(x) is also only an approximation to the quantity of interest. In particular, the sampling error of qj(x) has variance pj(1 − pj)/n, where pj is the probability that a random sample from the larger distribution has property qj. Taking the unavoidable sampling error as a comparison point, we argue that the error introduced by the Gaussian mechanism is tolerable as long as σ ≈ 1/ √ n. Furthermore, the output of the Gaussian mechanism remains useful as long as σ 1. For example, if σ ≤ 1/100, then each yj is an estimate of qj(x) whose standard deviation is 1% of the size of the dataset.
We give a self-contained analysis of the privacy guarantee afforded by the Gaussian mechanism using the Neyman-Pearson lemma. Rather than satisfying differential privacy as defined earlier, the Gaussian mechanism satisfies a variant called concentrated differential privacy (Dwork & Rothblum 2016; Bun & Steinke 2016 ).
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We demonstrate that, given the released output of M q,σ 2 (x), we cannot infer "much" about an individual in the dataset x, where "much" will be parameterized by ρ > 0. We formulate this in the language of hypothesis testing, by showing that any hypothesis about a single individual cannot be tested accurately.
13 However, the Gaussian mechanism is still useful in the sense that hypotheses about the population as a whole can be tested accurately given the output of the Gaussian mechanism. Thus we must distinguish hypotheses about individuals: Consider simple null and alternate hypotheses H0 and H1 about an individual in the dataset, where H0 is the hypothesis that the dataset is x and H1 is the hypothesis that the dataset is y. Here x and y differ only in the addition, removal, or modification of the data of one individual, who is the "subject" or "target" of this test. We show that it is impossible to accurately test H0 versus H1.
Lemma 19 (Neyman & Pearson (1933) ). Fix simple hypotheses H0 and H1. Define the log-likelihood ratio test statistic by LLR(q) = log
.
Then any test T is dominated by the likelihood ratio test. That is, for some threshold η depending on T .
Lemma 19 tells us that, rather than considering all possible tests T for H0 versus H1, we need only consider the likelihood ratio test. Under H0,q = M q,σ 2 (x) is distributed according to N (q(x), σ 2 I) and, under H1,q = M q,σ 2 (y) is distibuted according to N (q(y), σ 2 I). (qj(x) − qj(y)) (2qj − qj(x) − qj(y)) .
12 The properties of concentrated differential privacy are similar to those of differential privacy listed earlier. However, concentrated differential privacy gives a tighter and more elegant analysis of composition.
13 For more about formulating differential privacy using hypothesis testing, see Under H1, LLR(q) is distributed according to N (−ρ, 2ρ). Since x and y differ only on the data of one individual, the fractions qj(x) and qj(y) differ by at most 1/n. 14 Hence
If ρ is small (say, 0.1 or 0.01), then the distribution N (ρ, 2ρ) is very close to N (−ρ, 2ρ).
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By the Neyman-Pearson lemma, any test distinguishing H0 from H1 fares no better than distinguishing these distributions by means of a threshold. For example, if ρ = 0.01 and a test T has significance P [T (q) = reject|H0] ≤ 0.05, then we conclude that the power of T is bounded by P [T (q) = reject|H1] ≤ 0.067. Figure 2 shows how close these distributions are.
Similarly to differential privacy we can show that, for any test T and any ε ≥ ρ, For ρ = 0.01, the statistical distance (also called total variation distance) between LLR(q) under H0 versus H1 is 0.06. Hence, if ρ ≤ 0.01, then no test can correctly "guess" whether H0 or H1 holds with probability greater than 53% in both cases. A privacy attack can also be thought of as a test T . A tracing attack yields a test T to determine whether a target individual is included in the dataset, whereas a reconstruction attack entails multiple tests to determine the sensitive attribute of each user. Since the Gaussian mechanism ensures that these tests cannot be accurate, these attacks must fail. Thus, if k n 2 σ 2 , then ρ 1 and we can be assured that the output of M q,σ 2 (x) does not reveal sensitive information about the dataset x. also wish to acknowledge Salil Vadhan for many helpful conversations. A.S. is supported in part by a grant from the Sloan foundation, a Google Faculty Research Award, and NSF grant IIS-1447700. T.S. was supported by NSF grants CCF-1420938 and CNS-1237235.
